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Abstract 
 
 George Dickie’s Institutional Theory of Art satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions 
for definition, but by leaving evaluation open cannot address artistic capacities to outstrip the 
usefulness of the theory for appreciating the concept of art comprehensively or meaningfully. 
Artworks that are known to members of the central and peripheral artworld seep into the general 
purview of the population at large as known “great works” of art. Upon examination of works 
that garner significant cultural influence, works broadly appreciated as great works, we find that 
their resistance to Dickie’s concept of “the artworld” and its associated behaviors is that which 
makes them conspicuously significant. 
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The Issue 
 Given the insufficiency of earlier theories (the imitation and expression theories of art) to 
define art comprehensively, George Dickie set out to define art in opposition to some individuals 
who determined that “art” could not be defined. Unlike earlier attempts, Dickie’s institutional 
theory of art is broad enough to include any phenomena one can possibly construe under that 
term. It is inclusive of artworks from all times and places regardless of artist intention, realistic 
approximation, expression of emotion, or any number of other views philosophers have 
advanced prior to the institutional formulation. Given this broadly inclusive theory, we may be 
tempted to satisfaction. The concept of art, as now defined, is a problem that has been solved. 
Regardless of which works might come along, there exists a theory whose conditions will be 
sufficient to include it within our understanding of what art is without the need of any major 
theoretical overhaul.  
 However, within Dickie’s analysis he admits a potential weakness of the institutional 
account: it does not reveal everything that art is capable of doing, therefore, does not elaborate 
on the function of art within society generally outside the institution of the artworld. 
Additionally, it does not propose a way to determine the relative value of some art works over 
others. The inclusivity of the institutional theory makes this especially problematical. With so 
many participants within the artworld, how are we to explain how some works are more highly 
regarded, attain greater value, and become the centerpieces of the institutions that provide the 
necessary context for exhibition and appreciation, while others find themselves in less 
prestigious institutional settings or are relegated to museum vaults and storage rooms? 
 Herein lies the paradox of the institutional theory of art. In Dickie’s account, it is the 
most challenging works of art – works that require us to look beyond exhibited artistic properties 
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– that require an alternative appraisal; this fact lends the most strength to his assertion that we 
need to appreciate art works within an institutional context. The paradox is that often these works 
are the least likely to be generally accepted as works of art even by the artworld at their initial 
reception. Often in hindsight we can see their merits while the artworld of the time cannot. 
Especially, but not exclusively, with regard to those works whose initial reception was poor but 
are now held in the highest esteem, great works of art illuminate the paradox within institutional 
processes generally and within the artworld specifically. If we are to define the artworld and its 
various component systems as informal social institutions, whose existence is indicated by 
established rule, custom, tradition, etc., how can one explain the fact that within any given 
medium works that thwart established practice come to exemplify what is meant by a “work of 
art”? 
 My purpose in this essay is to show that an evaluative theory based on the precepts of the 
institutional theory will more clearly show its provisional nature. Great art is that art which 
deliberately resists subsumption under existing frameworks for appreciation. 
Method and Presuppositions 
 To demonstrate my claim, I will attempt to establish that institutions, and by extension 
the artworld, are fundamentally hierarchical. I will then draw out the negative implications of 
this fact by drawing parallels between Dickie’s concept of artworld and Theodore Roszak’s 
account of the technocracy, with emphasis on the processes by which institutions constrain that 
which falls under their purview – in this instance, art – and how this impacts our understanding 
of the value of art. I will continue this discussion with an appraisal of highly regarded works of 
art to illustrate that these artworks, and often the artists responsible for them, gain value with 
regard to their resistance to and criticism of institutional influences. I will then show how works 
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of art fundamentally question the separation made between artworld and world to demonstrate 
that the impetus for this separation lies in the institutional motivations to direct and control 
phenomena within their purview, from artworld to artists and works, for the purpose of 
constraining art’s power to influence life generally. I will conclude with an examination of the 
problems posed by exceptional works. 
 I will presuppose that Dickie’s first condition for art – that it be artifactual – is 
unproblematic.  I assume that when Dickie briefly mentions the expression theory of art, that he 
takes it to mean that theory that defines art as an expression of the artist’s emotion, and that he 
finds it insufficient on the basis of other refutations which indicate that other expressions of 
emotion, embraces, crying, and so on, are not themselves art. I will presuppose that my decision 
to focus on specific works generally embraced as art under the social/institutional artworld 
structure is unproblematic. Finally, I presuppose that a relativistic appreciation of art does not 
impede a theory’s ability to explain art.  
 While my analysis deals only with Dickie’s earlier version of the institutional theory, his 
later revisions do not bear on my analysis. 
The Text’s Argument 
 Dickie’s first task is a brief demonstration of how earlier theories of art were lacking 
based on their inability to provide necessary and sufficient conditions, and that the later 
determination that “art” cannot be defined is incorrect. He characterizes these as the Phases of 
art. Phase I contains attempts to define art, from the imitation theory on. He claims that within 
this phase attempts to define art begin and end with “accidental features of art” that merely 
“[characterize] art at a particular stage in its historical development.”(20) The imitation theory 
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addressed the accidental feature that art during its reign was representational; the visual arts were 
obviously so, music was “assumed to be in some sense,” and literary arts were so in their 
representation of life’s familiar scenes. (20) Nonobjective art’s proliferation at the turn of the 
century nullified this contention. Later, the expression theory of art focused on the relation not 
between art and life generally but art and the inner life of the artist, which Dickie claims was 
similarly inadequate; beyond that, “no other subsequent definition has been satisfactory.” (21)  
 So ends Phase I of art theory’s historical development. The contention that “art” cannot 
be defined is Phase II. Dickie’s (and any other) attempt to disprove this assertion by providing 
necessary and conditions is Phase III. It is characterized as the point at which we can define “art” 
in a way that “avoids the difficulties of the traditional definitions and [incorporates] the insights 
of the later analysis” (Phases I and II respectively). Dickie contends that Phase II failed to 
provide a definition of art because there were no exhibited properties of art that could lead to its 
definition and that an analysis of its nonexhibited properties will lead to a definition that satisfies 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept of art. (31) 
 Artifactuality is the first necessity for a thing to be art. Dickie allows for counterexamples 
of untreated objects, but claims that these are secondary, derivative cases from the primary or 
classificatory sense “work of art”; untreated objects become artifacts because human intervention 
is necessary for their appreciation as art, and that appreciation is predicated on their having some 
comparative relationship with artifactual works of art. For Dickie, the second condition 
necessary to define art will be indicated by the alternative treatment of art objects which 
distinguishes them from other objects. To formulate this condition, Dickie hearkens to Arthur 
Danto: specifically, to his essay, “The Artworld.”  
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 Danto looks to the nonexhibited properties of artworks and discovers the integrative 
context of the artworld. That a contextual observation is necessary indicates to Danto the 
requirement that art be appreciated in terms of its institutional embeddedness; though this is left 
relatively undeveloped, Dickie claims that Danto’s insights are incorporable into the case he 
makes for the second and final condition necessary to define art. Taken from Danto’s essay, this 
condition, briefly stated, is the artworld – that “to see something as art requires something the 
eye cannot descry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an 
artworld” (Danto, 218) and that this pronouncement indicates “the institutional nature of art” 
(Dickie, 29). “Given the great variety of the systems of the art-world it is not surprising that 
works of art have no exhibited properties in common. If, however, we step back and view the 
works in their institutional setting, we will be able to see the essential properties they share.” (31) 
` The second condition is “a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status 
of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social 
institution (the artworld)” (34). This contains four principal components. The first is the 
requirement of an agent acting on behalf of the artworld. This person performs the major action 
required by the second component, the conferral of status on an object, whose status is the third 
component, that of candidacy. The object is thus a candidate for potential appreciation by the 
artworld – the fourth and final component of the second condition. Agents of the artworld are 
thus described: the “essential core” of the artworld consists of artists, presenters of work, and 
immediate audience (goers – theater-goers, museum-goers, etc.). Dickie calls this the 
“presentation group,” the bare-minimum roles necessary for the existence of the artworld. Agents 
outside this group are latter members and can only enter the picture after the rudiments of the 
institution have been established. This nonessential group consists of artists, producers, museum 
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directors, museum-goers, theater-goers, reporters, critics, art historians, art theorists, 
philosophers, and “others.” (35-6) These members of the artworld wield the necessary 
qualifications to function as agents with the capability of conferring the status of “artwork” on an 
object. They can act individually or as a group in the conferral of status, the purpose of which is 
to differentiate art objects from objects that are not art; objects that are not art are objects which 
have not had status conferred on them by agents of the artworld. The status conferred in this 
process is that of candidacy which necessarily leads to the nature of that candidacy, not 
necessarily as art, but as candidate for the potential appreciation as a work of art. This 
appreciation is dependent on the institutional embeddedness of the object, not on the sort of 
appreciation utilized by the appreciator.  
 Dickie defines the artworld as “the broad social institution in which works of art have 
their place” (29) and under which subsystems of art – theater, visual art, and so on – have their 
place. In describing it as a broad social institution, Dickie distinguishes the character of the 
artworld as an informal institution, rather than a specific kind of established, formal institution 
which would, unlike the artworld, have “specified procedures and lines of authority” (35), but 
like the artworld would have the ability to confer status on phenomena under its judgment. Its 
institutional character is associated but not wedded to concrete establishments, as in the case of 
established societies or corporations, but is more broadly defined as custom, law, tradition, 
practice, etc (31). Its purpose is to provide a framework for the presentation and exhibition of 
artworks. Although Dickie sees that the artworld has, to some extent, marginally achieved 
formalization, he notes that this is generally perceived as negative by people interested in art – 
that formalization threatens the “freshness and exuberance” of art (35). However, this is not to 
say that the artworld concept is a limiting factor. Its value lies in its elasticity in that various 
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subsystems of art can accommodate innovations under their purview without threatening the 
broadly inclusive character of the artworld generally. 
 
Analysis of the Text’s Argument 
Hierarchy 
 Intimations of institutional hierarchy begin in Danto’s initial conception of the artworld. 
While he claims that individuals have the capacity to identify works of art with the “is” of artistic 
identification – a skill any child can easily master – he goes on to claim that it is necessary to 
define art to make explicit what people already know. Artistic complexity in modern works, 
especially with regard to works that are perceptually indistinguishable from objects that are not 
art, have put people in a difficult situation in which a theory is required to indicate when one 
finds oneself on artistic terrain. “To see something as art requires something the eye cannot 
descry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld” (218). 
For this reason, theories (and, presumably, theorists) occupy the highest position in the artworld 
hierarchy, as individuals with the authority to determine what will and will not count as art 
within the institutional context. Without this determinative structure, “one is unlikely to see [an 
object] as art…in order to see it as part of the artworld, one must have mastered a good deal of 
artistic theory” (220).  
 Dickie does not share the same preference for theory in structuring the artworld, but he 
nonetheless maintains a hierarchal nature for its structure. At the top, the “presentation group” – 
artists, presenters, audience - furnishes the “essential core” of the world from which the rest of 
the attendant agents, including theorists and philosophers, develop. Here the work and its creator 
are only one of a number of necessary agents who coordinate their activities in the business of 
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conferring status, candidacy, and appreciation on and of works of art. While Dickie allows 
within his theory the possible situation of a single individual operating in all of these roles, the 
rest of his account privileges the conglomerate functioning of the artworld in implicitly claiming 
that a work is not a work in virtue of being made to be a work of art, and therefore art, but that it 
gains surer status as art according to whether it satisfies the various functionaries and provides 
necessary material for the various actors of the artworld for the institution’s existence. It is how 
the work comes to be evaluated and appreciated by presenters and audience, not that it has been 
made with Art in mind, with the possibility of furnishing that event, that is important for Dickie. 
Essentially, even though Dickie describes the presentation group as a tri-part whole, it is the 
presentation class – presenters, managers, administrators – of the artworld who gain the highest 
status in his hierarchy. They become the quintessential arbiters of artistic value and status in that 
world. 
 In Dickie’s institutional theory the expression theory of art is inadequate for unspecified 
reasons. Although he allows for the single-agent scenario, artists themselves are inherently 
incapable of determining the value of their own works. Some amount of meaning, value, and/or 
status is interdependent, making the artworld a requirement for art’s definition and, by extension, 
valuation and interpretation. While ideally this interplay privileges the communications between 
artist/work, work/audience, and audience/artist, that Dickie divides ‘audience’ into “goers” and 
“presenters” leads one to the conclusion that there is some especially necessary role that 
presenters play in defining art within the artworld. To some extent, this hearkens to Danto’s 
point that theorists play a critical role in determining the boundaries within which art can come 
to being; they determine the forms of the artworld. For Dickie it is not theorists but the 
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presentation class who authorize art and the artworld; meaning, value, and status of artworks are 
beholden to the opinions (well informed, we assume) of the artworld’s authorities.  
 This is presumably a positive development; not just anyone, not just any art should be 
included in the Artworld, easily accessible to goers of prestigious art museums and whatever 
other institutions occupy the highest positions within the artworld. There needs to be a filter that 
separates college tries from serious works. But with the conceptual artworld being so broad, what 
is it that determines the difference between the High Art of the Met and the Low Art of that 
which occupies the space under someone’s bed or what she keeps buried in her hard drive? Even 
if we abandon traditional high art/low art distinctions, challenged most desperately in the early 
years of the film medium’s development, how do we come to value some works more highly 
than others, and how do some works gain higher relative status than other works as art? 
 Shall we rely on measurable figures - how much individuals are willing to pay for some 
works, in some cases astronomical amounts of money? In this case, it is marketability, 
specifically marketability as a work of art, which determines relative value of some works over 
others. However, why should we assume that the people with the deepest pockets or greatest 
amount of disposable wealth have the requisite capacity to determine what makes great art? 
Taking film as an example, why should we appreciate works with the highest budget and/or box 
office return as great art? Surely we want to avoid this as an evaluative method. It runs the risk of 
valuing Pirates of the Caribbean as art more than films made on much lower budgets; Darren 
Aronofsky’s Pi, for instance. Even if we avoid this as an evaluative scheme, it is useful as an 
illustration of the intersection between the artworld and other major institutions – the market, in 
this case. 
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 To take a more amorphous scheme, let us posit relative cultural value as that which 
confers higher status on more valuable works of art. To some extent, this would be determined 
by popularity among the class of artworld agents in the broadest sense. The works we, as a 
culture, value most highly will find themselves hanging in more prestigious institutions than 
works we have not embraced so fully – the difference between works that hang in museums 
rather than low-level art galleries, music performed at Mahalia Jackson Theater rather than 
Bourbon St., works of cinema that receive honors at the Academy Awards rather than those that 
screen at the New Orleans Film Festival - Louisiana Shorts program. Implicit hierarchical bias 
can find its way here too, however. While this kind of measure avoids the problems of a purely 
market-oriented approach, it serves to reinforce the tastes held by the status quo. Even New 
Orleans Museum of Art hangs portraits of long-dead aristocratic family members, while other 
works might enjoy a brief run at a Julia St. gallery and because of their limited exposure do not 
accord the same relative value, even if they could be judged as “better” works of art.  
 Those portraits, though – even if the subject matter or content is culturally lacking insofar 
as they only satisfy the tastes of certain classes, the technical prowess of the artists who paint 
them is nothing to scoff at and can account for the high regard placed on them by authorities 
within that segment of the artworld. This prowess is, to some extent, an implicit mechanism of 
evaluation in Dickie’s institutional theory when he indicates the institutional nature of the 
artworld as informal. Tradition, ways of doing and behaving, exquisite elaboration of convention 
in painting, well-mastered appreciation of the rules of painting a portrait – these are accounted 
for in the conferring of status of these paintings as art rather than mere documentation of 
someone who once lived and whose family was wealthy enough to pay for the commission.  
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 Unfortunately, this criterion is also problematic. In response to Andrew Sarris’ American 
adaptation of the auteur theory of film, Pauline Kael addressed the problem of technical 
competence as a criterion for artistic excellence. He claims that to be a great director, one must 
first be a good director – must have at least the technical competence established in film’s 
convention. Kael’s response, and mine, to the criterion of technical prowess in determining 
relative value of works of art over others:  
Sometimes the greatest artists in a medium bypass or violate the 
simple technical competence that is so necessary for hacks…an 
artist who is not a good technician can indeed create new 
standards, because standards of technical competence are based on 
comparisons with work already done. (Kael, 14) 
 To continue my illustration of the artworld’s hierarchy problems and how they complicate the 
problem of determining a reliable evaluative scheme, I will now open the ground with Theodore 
Roszak’s The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its 
Youthful Opposition. 
Technocracy 
 Roszak defines technocracy as a “regime of experts,” that society in which “the scale and 
intricacy of all human activities – political, economic, cultural – transcends the competence of 
the amateurish citizen and inexorably demands the attention of specially trained experts.” (6) Its 
experts are “certified” experts; those who act in service to the highest levels of institutional 
structures, whether state or corporate (10-11). Their expertise comes from their ability to 
“[cultivate] an objective consciousness” (208), the only kind of useful consciousness within a 
technocracy, as it produces things of value – knowledge, solutions to problems, power (53), 
while that which is “not fully and articulably available in the waking consciousness for empirical 
or mathematical manipulation” is placed in the “cultural garbage can” of the “negative catch-all 
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category” of the “purely subjective” (52-3). Its experts are not interested in “inner feelings” until 
they can be rationalized or controlled; in fact, “those outbursts of fluid, imprecise, distractive 
imaginings that well up from the ‘irrational’” (225) are the only obstacle to the technocracy’s 
goal of perfected, centralized organization (18) by means of “[leveling] life down to a 
standard…that technical expertise can cope with.” (12)  It is ideologically invisible; its experts 
“have risen above ideology…insofar as the traditional ideologies are concerned” (21), its values 
and assumptions about reality are “as unobtrusively pervasive as the air we breathe” (8) and 
“have become the buried premises from which intellectual and ethical judgments proceed” (50). 
 Under Danto’s view, “art-historical complexities must yield before the exigencies of 
logical exposition” (212) and cannot transcend the competence of what the experts, theorists of 
art, can deal with. Even so, people are capable of recognizing art when they see it; or they were, 
before art got too complicated for amateurs, those not grounded in “a good deal of artistic 
theory” (220), without which they are unlikely to see an object as art. In his view theory not only 
helps us to determine which objects are art in contrast to other objects, but furthermore is 
required for art to be possible at all. Some of the first human attempts at art are not even art until 
a theorist comes along; the brilliant, nameless artists of early cave paintings would not have the 
capacity to conceive “that they were producing art on those walls…unless there were Neolithic 
aestheticians” (220). Art is impossible until the experts fathom its existence, then confirm its 
nature for the rest of us. In other words, not until authority was consecrated as a fact of human 
existence in its civilized, institutional, ultimately technocratic form is art even possible. 
 One of the great skills mastered by the technocracy is its capacity to assimilate challenges 
made to its predominance. “Leisure, entertainment, culture as a whole, the unconscious drives, 
even…protest against the technocracy itself: all these become the subjects of purely technical 
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scrutiny and of purely technical manipulation” (Roszak, 6). It has an overwhelming capacity to 
overcome or trivialize challenges to its structure and entrenched influence. To resist the 
technocracy is to avoid “commercial verminization” and “neutralization” (70) of experimental 
behaviors that contrast with the status quo - not to submit to the whims of market or culture, or 
be consumed by them. Resistance emerges “to overcome the commercializing and trivializing 
tactics of technocratic society…” (72). While Roszak was concerned with the counter-cultural 
movements of the 1960s, his observations bear equally well on the accounts of the artworld 
elaborated by Dickie. His “broad institution in which works of art have their place” (29), 
populated as it is with authorities whose determinations bear on which works will get the most 
attention, and subsystems with their own established consistencies and boundaries, can change in 
the same way other institutions – religious, commercial, governmental – can change (30). They 
adapt to the challenges posed to them by destroying or assimilating the challengers. Therefore, 
art that flouts narrative film convention becomes “experimental film,” music accommodates new 
forms by splitting itself into various genres, classical, blues, jazz, each with its own “established 
[ways] of doing and behaving” (30). What remains intact is the technocracy, and the artworld, 
respectively. There is no limit to the number of systems to be subsumed “under the generic 
conception of art” which provides “the elasticity whereby creativity of even the most radical sort 
can be accommodated” (33). What matters is that we maintain an acceptance of rational 
delineation of the phenomena under our purview, whether as agents of artworld or technocracy. 
What matters is that the institutional theory is no threat to creativity, regardless of whether artists 
concern themselves with the business of philosophers or not. The objective here, laid bare, is that 
accounting for the art concept, in all its complexity, in terms of how in manifests itself 
institutionally, only serves to rationalize art in a way that avoids accounting for its impetus and 
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the content it contains, resistant as they are to formal explication. It is therefore useful to 
examine works that stretch to the breaking point the boundaries supposedly laid, however 
loosely, on the informally institutional artworld, as this will shed light on how some works gain 
an elevated status – as objects that symbolize the spoils of war. 
Recalcitrance 
 Taken from the examples Danto offers, Andy Warhol is one brilliant example of how 
artists can challenge the institution by defying the established ways of doing and behaving that 
up to that point had populated the artworld, in visual arts especially but also in film. Taking us 
further back in art’s history we arrive at Fountain and Dada generally, also obvious examples of 
art’s persistent attempts to defy classification and definition, even if Dickie defends their 
activities as perfect examples of how influential, not to say cannibalizing, a concept the 
institutional theory can be. He does not classify it as great art, but it does provide a great example 
not just of the theoretical necessity of appreciating art in the context of its institutional 
manifestation, though it was an obvious protest against the reigning powers. To continue with a 
reference and description of Walter De Maria’s High Energy Bar [Plate 1] further highlights my 
point – while it exists as art within the institutional setting it simultaneously parodies the concept 
to an unmitigated degree. Even if we would rather avoid classifying these recalcitrant works as 
Great art, they are consistent exemplifications of the fact that an art object’s resistance to 
institutionally enforced standards is an object that refuses to be classified as anything but art. 
They are not brand advertisements, even if they carry a brand, not celebrations of the institution, 
but parodies of it, not propaganda for the unchallenged entrenchment of the status quo but 
rejections of its influence in determining what we can or cannot accept as works of art. 
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 These are examples of works that make their home comfortably within the settings 
furnished by the various art systems, but our time has supplied ever-more dismissive examples.  
Banksy, the wildly famous and infamous artist responsible for the explosion of public interest in 
highly aestheticised works of street art that score high returns for galleries who manage to carve 
out sections of wall that carry his signature images, is a brilliant example not just of someone 
thwarting the institutional setting explicitly, but of challenging institutional structures generally 
[Plates 2, 3, 4]. Lenny Bruce, the firebrand comic, similarly used his art not just to completely 
revolutionize the medium of stand-up comedy but also to revolutionize what was socially 
acceptable to discuss on many fronts. Trey Parker and Matt Stone, the irreverent pair behind 
South Park, similarly challenged what is and is not acceptable within the sterilized medium of 
theater, but most recently in their musical The Book of Mormon. These are not just challenges to 
the artworld institution, but are challenges to the structure under which the artworld institution 
exists – that of the technocracy. They challenge authority generally. They illuminate the 
conditions of the world under its control. In this way, works of great art not only test institutional 
boundaries but question the value of setting them up in the first place; they force us to consider 
the conceptual dissolution of the world of art from the world itself. 
Awesome Dissolution 
 In responding to the Socratic charge in Plato’s Republic that art produced under the reign 
of the imitation theory showed us only what was already apparent and mirrored the world in a 
distracting, unhelpful way, Danto observes that Shakespeare, through Hamlet, recognized that 
reflective surfaces “show us what we could not otherwise perceive – our own face and 
form…art, insofar as it is mirrorlike, reveals us to ourselves” (211) and is of some cognitive 
utility after all. The process the artist undertakes through art is a serious and dangerous business, 
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one that occasionally threatens to free the human imagination only to have it spill itself out onto 
life and color the world in a way that shows us our flawed assumptions about the state of things. 
This is a dangerous business because people often respond to this kind of challenge in a callous 
way and, every so often, in a blatantly violent way. Take, for instance, Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Salo, 
which incited someone to murder the artist, or Alejandro Jodorowsky’s Fando y Lis, which 
incited a riot when it premiered in Mexico. When works of art result in this kind of action, it is 
incumbent on any rational person to question what divide there is between art and the world, and 
under what circumstances it can dissolve to the point that a metaphorical portrayal of fascism 
(Salo) or sexism (Fando) can lead to genuine violence in response to that kind of abrasive 
cultural defiance. Are these responses only to what is objectively presented, or is there some 
paradoxical dissolution of the world of the fiction, firmly placed in its artworld setting, and the 
‘real’ world in which we do the rest of our living? 
 Roszak speaks of the alienative dichotomy as the first requirement in objective 
consciousness’s psychic style. It divides the “In-Here” of the observing consciousness from the 
“Out-There” of the world. In order to properly measure the world, it considers the two realms as 
distant as possible from one another, accomplishing this through the “intervention of various 
mechanical gadgets between observer and observed” and the replacement of “sensuous speech” 
with “chilly jargons and technical terms.” (218) The In-Here is an alternative term he uses in 
place of subject, ego, intelligence, reason, etc. because these terms “suggest some fixed faculty 
or psychic entity” where the emphasis here is rather on the very act of contraction, in “the sense 
of taking a step back, away from, and out of [the natural world, feelings, urges, and 
imagination].” (220) In this view, “…the In-Here is committed to studying the Out-There as if it 
were completely stupid, meaning without intention or wisdom or purposeful pattern…it must not 
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attribute to Out-There what cannot be observed, measured, and – ideally – formulated into 
articulate, demonstrable propositions for experimental verification.” (221-2) 
 This is in direct contrast to the way an artist approaches the world, and works of great art 
consistently present this message; that art observes reality as if the subjective In-Here is 
inextricable from the Out-There of the objective world, and attempts to show to others the 
middle-ground they have accomplished. No matter what the artist “represents” or “expresses,” no 
matter what institutional framework comes to house the work, the work consistently elevates the 
status of the surrounding world with the subject that observes it. There is never a division 
between the world “out there” and the world “in here” in the work of the artist, except in the 
degree that they can be inextricable. But Danto reminds us that “the world has to be ready for 
certain things, the artworld no less than the real one.” (Danto, 220) I think this claim is 
reasonable enough in light of my earlier examples where the world, nor the artworld, were yet 
ready to receive the works artists offered. The ironic twist on this situation is that this art, that is 
most difficult for the artworld to immediately subsume under its existing frameworks, is the art 
that we later come to see as Great art. This kind of art forces change from within the institution.. 
 Of course, every individual is entitled to her own pantheon of great art and great artists; 
however, I would like to continue elaborating on my contention that great works of art have as 
their qualification content that radically questions conventional barriers, not only those we place 
to separate the artworld from the world but that we place between ourselves and the world 
outside. Danto approaches a provocative territory when he describes the relationship of the 
artworld to the world as analogous to the relationship between the City of God and those beheld 
in the world. (220) If we are to take his contention to be a brief explication of the difference 
between theory and practice, between the ideal and the real, then art that challenges this 
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boundary is of profound importance to philosophy in its own self-reflection. Roszak makes an 
observation similar to but to a degree more emotive than Danto’s: that “the artist who clings to 
his impossible vision at least preserves that much of heaven among us; the mad realist who turns 
from that vision for the sake of another ‘practical’ measure only takes us one step further into the 
hell of our alienation.” (101)  
Transgressive Vision: The Adversarial Art of Godfrey Reggio 
 Filmmaker Godfrey Reggio was tempted out of the Christian Brotherhood because of 
conflicts of interest he had with the Catholic Church, but was inspired to extend his religious 
quest when he elected to transition to filmmaking. His inspiration came from another adversarial 
figure in the artworld – Louis Bunuel – when he had what he considered a profoundly spiritual 
experience through Bunuel’s The Young and the Damned.  Like Bunuel, Reggio would present 
works of cinematic art that challenged established filmmaking conventions. At the recent U.S. 
premiere of his latest film, Visitors, presented at the 2013 New Orleans Film Festival, Reggio 
opened the film with a number of interesting preludes. He warned the audience: do not come to 
the experience of this film trying to figure out what it means – you will miss the whole thing; do 
not expect an arresting narrative – if that’s what you want, you should leave; do not expect this 
to fit into traditional narrative/documentary categories – it is neither. 
 The film, shot in black and white, is composed of only 74 shots – averaging about 70 
seconds per shot, which is unheard of for most individuals in the film world (barring other 
adversarial figures, e.g. Warhol). Many of the shots are slow-motion images of people – all kinds 
and looks of people – who stare, often unblinking, into the camera surrounded by a neutral 
“blackground”. It begins with this kind of shot, trained on a gorilla, then moves to human images 
as well as depictions of the abandoned Charity Hospital and Six Flags in and around New 
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Orleans, bayou areas of Louisiana, and disembodied hands dancing on invisible screens and 
keyboards.   
 Reggio says it is not narrative or documentary cinema but in poetic cinema. Speaking to 
the meaning of the film, whether or not in contained one, he told the audience that rather than a 
text, that the better way of seeing the work is as a texture. The importance of these guides, rather 
than aiming to guide each audience member on the same journey, was that art, properly 
understood, ought to produce different experiences for each individual; this, he claimed, made it 
art rather than propaganda or advertisement. The nature of the film’s content – seeing into the 
eyes of others intimately, and for long periods of time, also served as a device that rather than 
specifying a subject from within the film, made each audience member the film’s proper subject 
– what Reggio described as a “reciprocal gaze.” 
 My discussion of art’s adversarial nature was eloquently mirrored by Reggio during my 
actual experience of the film, as well as in remarks he made before and after the film’s 
presentation. In the process of “reciprocal gaze” the world of the audience became the world of 
the film, dissolving the conventional barrier separating the In-Here from the Out-There; 
simultaneously his claim that each audience member was the subject of the film, and that each 
would have a different experience of it, mirrors my claim that the business of great art is to 
dissolve the barrier between world (audience experience pre-film) and artworld (the film itself).  
Of my claim that art, especially great art, is resistant to its institutionality, Reggio’s Visitors, like 
my earlier examples, defies established conventions within its medium. To draw out my claims 
against technocratic institutionality in reference to Reggio specifically, his later commentary 
described his work as responding to the detached, abstracted nature of so much of human 
behavior. What he attempted to do was provide an experience for the viewer not only because 
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experience is always more powerful than abstraction, but because art, especially artistic images, 
are extra-mental and have a “beyond-cognitive effect” – that the proper question for a viewer is 
not “(what) does it make me think?” but “does it move me”?  
 This is, he claims, what art is all about; like religion, it is a spiritual exercise. Speaking 
directly to both Danto’s views on artworld as theoretical necessity and Dickie’s implicit 
embodiment of this view in his need to theorize about the total nature of art, Art, claims Reggio – 
the resulting expression of it, its manifestation – is always bigger than the concept that goes into 
it. The process of creating artwork is like taking a long journey, and is opposed to abstraction. 
For Reggio, and presumably for many other artists, works, and the people that are inspired by 
them, art’s objective fully understood is to ennoble and release what is trying to be born through 
the work – it is the act of freeing the collective spirit. This freedom is achieved, I would add, by 
breaking the boundaries that held it in the first place, set by theories, conventions, institutions, 
and anything else that would seek to constrain that which will always seek its own expression. 
 To my claim, Dickie would most likely respond that its objections to the institutional 
account – though I have not really attempted to overthrow it, just to identify how an evaluative 
account of art could undermine his foundation – addresses the issues I raise, specifically when he 
claims that while “species” of art in their various media are subject to change and adaptation 
while the artworld itself remains essentially unaffected by such perturbation. To this, I would say 
that when multiple works of art, consistently through time and from multiple “subspecies” of art, 
all converge in their recalcitrance to institutional frameworks, it is incumbent on the theorist and 
everyone else interested in art to question the usefulness of relegating art to its artworld sphere 
apart from the rest of reality. 
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Conclusion 
 My attempt here has been to establish that art is best understood when we engage with 
extraordinary examples, with works that cannot be understood as anything other than art. These 
works gain status as great works of art by defying the informal institution of the artworld, 
characterized as the continuation of tradition, established convention, and the rules of the 
medium, enforced by the upper echelons of the institutional artworld. This analysis serves to 
undermine Dickie’s claim that no matter what other factors we choose to focus on in discussions 
of art, that art can be understood in the context the institution of the artworld because this 
analysis satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions for definition. My claim undermines this 
view by looking for an evaluative framework from the perspective of the institutional theory. 
While the theory itself has not been undermined – Dickie makes allowances for “exceptions to 
the rules” in individual mediums, claims that the artworld can be completely represented by an 
individual acting in multiple institutional roles, that artists need not fear the strictures of formal 
institutionality – the character of the theory is undermined when we see that works of great art, 
first seen as “bizarre” or even “not art” by the artworld, often enough become quintessential 
examples of “works of art.” 
 One could counter my claim with the claim that I deliberately cite works that support my 
theory, rather than making a broad examination of artworks generally. To this claim, I can only 
say that the point of my examination is to resolve the issue that the artworld defined by Dickie is 
so broad as to include what any person does in the name of art, whether it comes to significance 
or not; this leaves the issue too broad for a thorough perusal of all art to find how close or far 
these works would come to supporting my theory. Nor I or anyone else can really comb the 
world of art in any thorough way; the terrain is as broad and expansive as the creative and 
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conceptual world. One could also claim that my theory is flawed in that it attempts to evaluate art 
in a general way, which is taboo for the reason that each person will bring different tastes and 
experiences to the works of art they experience and will therefore come away with a different 
scale, valuing some works more highly than others, in a way that does not at all consider whether 
the works they like the best are institutionally irreverent. To this, I have no counter-claim; I think 
it is better to make an attempt at my own reasonable evaluative scheme and leave others to theirs, 
and leave finer points for a well-lubricated debate, because ultimately I agree with Reggio in his 
belief that each person should come away from the experience of art with a different experience. 
I suppose to this I could say that, in each individual case, the art they respond to with exuberance 
and awe is that which challenges their own inner institution – the conventions and established 
ways of doing that they have in their own minds. 
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